Dialogues between Vasubandhu’s No-Self View and Sidgwick’s Universal Benevolence

Vasubandhu provides one of the most influential and detailed Buddhist arguments to suggest that self or personhood is a mental construct, though the structure of arguments deserves further reconstruction and clarification. According to Parfit, the conflict between morality and self-interest is what prevents moral activities from succeeding in real life. Sidgwick's impersonal ethics are one way to reconcile this contradiction. In this essay, Sidgwick's maxim of kindness is examined, along with its underlying premise—the reachability of the universal point of view. Then, in response to two personalistic arguments, this paper reconstructs Vasubandhu's no-self view in Abhidharmakoa and draws the conclusion that individuals can engage in impersonal ethics if they are successful in dispelling their sense of self through Yogcar's meditation.ct. This paper identifies the argumentative structure of Vasubandhu’s no-self account through philosophical reconstruction and provides a comparative perspective to resolve the self-interest dilemma by justifying the implicit premise of Sidgwick’s impersonal ethics. Overall, this paper attempts to introduce no-self view in Buddhism to analytic philosophy since dialogue between East and West will enrich the perspectives and methods of current philosophical community. Buddhist tradition and its philosophical treasures are immense treasures for academia and deserve further recognition.